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JESSICA A. REBARBER* 
Credit Suisse v. Billing: The Limited Impact on 
Application of Antitrust Laws in Federally 
Regulated Industries Following the 2008 Financial 
Crisis and Beyond 
In Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing,1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
considered whether antitrust laws were implicitly precluded from being brought in 
underwriting securities activities regulated by the securities laws.2  The Court held 
that antitrust laws were implicitly precluded from this specific area because there 
was a “clear repugnancy” between antitrust laws and the regulatory scheme that 
would cause dangerous, inconsistent standards if antitrust laws were enforced in 
tandem with the underwriting securities regulations.3  The Court narrowly and con-
sistently extended its previous precedents in finding implied antitrust immunity.4 
The Court’s holding in Billing created a workable standard of when implied im-
munity applies to federal antitrust laws.  Under this standard, implied antitrust 
immunity is not likely to be even narrowly extended to other federally regulated in-
dustries which, like securities laws, have been deemed by the Court to be ‘pervasive-
ly’ regulated. This narrow holding will not be extended within the securities indus-
try itself following the even after the regulatory response within the securities 
industry following 2007-2008 financial crisis.5 
I. The Case 
Plaintiffs, a group of recent buyers of newly issued securities, alleged that Credit 
Suisse and nine other major underwriting firms engaged in a vast Wall Street con-
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 * J.D. 2011, University of Maryland School of Law, The Johns Hopkins University (B.A. International 
Studies), Krieger School of Arts & Sciences, January 2008. 
 1. 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 267. 
 3. Id. at 264. 
 4. See infra Part II.D and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part IV.D. 
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spiracy.6  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that these leading ten securities under-
writing firms created illegal contracts with securities purchasers in initial public of-
ferings (IPOs).7  More specifically, the underwriting firms, acting as a syndicate, al-
legedly inflated the market price of securities in the IPO after-market.8  Because of 
this seemingly collusive activity, the underwriting firms were accused of violating 
several antitrust statutes: § 1 of the Sherman Act of 18909 and § 2(c) of the Robin-
son-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act of 1936.10  The underwriting firms allegedly 
harmed both direct IPO purchasers and after-market purchasers.11  The plaintiffs 
explicitly alleged that the underwriting firms were involved in a conspiracy to get 
certain “anti-competitive” considerations from IPO purchasers through tie-in 
agreements.12  These tie-in agreements would require the IPO purchasers to pur-
chase inflated commissions on trades of other securities, to purchase issuer’s shares 
in a secondary public offering, to purchase less attractive securities, or to execute a 
laddering transaction.13 Any of these options practically would require an IPO pur-
                                                                
 6. In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. by Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled by Credit 
Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). Underwriting is a common method of taking on the financial risks 
associated with the price ‘fluctuations’ during the initial distribution of new securities. There are several forms 
of underwriting securities (best efforts, stand-by, firm commitment), but the point of underwriting is to offset 
costs and risks associated with an IPO while simultaneously making money for the invest firm doing the un-
derwriting. Gershon Mandelker & Arthur Raviv,  Investment Banking: An Economic Analysis of Optimal Under-
writing Contacts 32 J. FIN. 683, 684 (1977) (arguing that issuers choose the type of underwriting that will max-
imize their wealth). 
 7. In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 499.  An IPO is the block of securities that 
is initially offered to the public at a certain price after the underwriting syndicate goes through its process.  IPO, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
 8. In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 499.  The after-market is the market in 
which securities that have already been issued are traded. A syndicate is a group comprised of members of the 
leading underwriting firms which allows underwriters to assume less overall financial risk. The syndicate agrees 
to purchase an entire ‘issue’ of securities discharged by a corporation at a pre-fixed price. The syndicate then 
immediately resells the issue to the public at a slightly higher rate, called the issue price. Underwriting is a for-
profit business. See Katrina Ellis, et al., When the Underwriter is the Market Maker: An Examination of Trading in 
the IPO Aftermarket, 55 J. FIN. 1039, 1039, 1044–1045 (2000) (arguing that the lead underwriter is the “domi-
nant market maker”). 
 9. Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2006)). Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act forbids contracts and conspiracies from creating an “unreasonable” restraint of trade. See Stuart 
M. Reynolds, Jr., The Relationship of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries and Intellectual Property in the New 
Marketplace, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2002). See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 10. Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 
(2006)). Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act forbids individuals and companies from using brokerage 
methods to buy and sell items. Id. See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 11. In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 510. 
 12. Id.  A tie-in is a relationship between underwriters and prospective purchasers where the purchaser 
must give consideration above the stated offering price to receive an allocation of the shares. For example, an 
underwriter could require buyers to take part in other offerings, place orders for the IPO after-market for the 
same security they are purchasing in the initial issue. While some manipulation of IPOs and after-market is 
allowed by the SEC, tie-ins are specifically prohibited.  Id. at 515. 
 13. Id. 
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chaser to pay above-market prices for their desired securities.14  Plaintiffs also al-
leged harm to after-market purchasers because they would have to buy securities at 
an intentionally inflated price.15  Plaintiffs alleged that these illegal agreements were 
accomplished by the underwriting firms agreeing to allocate very large numbers of 
IPO securities as long as the institutional defendants agreed to comply with the un-
derwriters’ policies.16 
The Southern District of New York granted the defendant underwriters’ motion 
to dismiss, holding that the underwriting firms were not liable under antitrust laws 
because the securities laws impliedly repealed federal antitrust claims and 
preempted state antitrust laws.17 The Court stated that any implied immunity analy-
sis “require[d] a fairly fact-specific inquiry into the nature and extent of regulatory 
action that allegedly conflict[ed] with antitrust law.”18  After discussing the SEC’s 
authority and pervasive ability to regulate broker-dealer conduct and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the Court concluded that there was a 
“plain repugnancy” between the antitrust laws and the federal regulatory scheme 
and thus implied antitrust immunity was applicable.19 
Billing appealed the district court’s decision, arguing that antitrust laws were not 
implicitly precluded by securities laws.20  The Second Circuit overturned the district 
court’s decision and held that the securities laws did not ‘shelter’ the underwriting 
firms from being liable under antitrust laws.21  The Court then noted that there was 
no legislative history indicative of a Congressional intent to “immunize anticompe-
titive tie-in agreements.”22  The Court stated that there was no threat of “irreconcil-
able mandates” if the antitrust laws were permitted to be enforced.23  The Second 
Circuit finally explained that the SEC never authorized the specific anticompetitive 
behavior at issue.24 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide whether se-
curities laws were impliedly immunized from antitrust laws.25  
                                                                
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. at 497. 
 16. Id. at 507 (“[T]he Underwriter Defendants engaged in a secret ‘centralizing agreement’ that the lead 
underwriter ‘could itself distribute all the shares of each Class Security.’”). 
 17. Id. at 524. 
 18. Id. at 504. 
 19. Id. at 518. 
 20. Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2005) overruled by Credit Suisse 
Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 21. Id. at 137. 
 22. Id. at 169. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id., cert granted, 549 U.S. 1092 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2007) (No. 05-1157).  In the order granting certiorari, Jus-
tice Kennedy recused himself from hearing the case. 
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II. Legal Background 
The Supreme Court has hesitantly approved implied antitrust immunity in federally 
regulated industries26 over the past century.27  The Court has consistently recognized 
that it is important to preserve market competition.28 The Supreme Court has held 
that implied immunity to federal antitrust laws only applies to ‘pervasively’ regu-
lated federal industries.29  If an industry is pervasively regulated, the Court will ex-
tend implied antitrust immunity to the minimum extent necessary to make the reg-
ulatory scheme effective.30  While recognizing that antitrust laws and federal 
regulatory schemes sometimes have differing goals, the Court has also recognized 
that these two areas can coexist without the need for implied immunity.31   
The Court has narrowly found implied immunity of antitrust in securities laws 
in three main cases.32  This implied immunity is limited to a small set of circums-
tances that has been refined by the Court over the past half-century, reflecting the 
need to preserve the purposes of antitrust and the integrity of the unique niche of 
securities laws themselves.33   
While there has been an increase in federal regulation of the financial sector fol-
lowing the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the importance of federal antitrust laws re-
mains intact.34 Antitrust laws will not be superseded by an influx of implied anti-
trust immunity findings.35 
A. The history of antitrust laws demonstrates that they serve an important purpose in 
the preservation of competition. 
American antitrust law originated in response to the large monopolies, trusts and 
cartels that characterized America’s post-Industrial Revolution business landscape.36  
The first antitrust legislation in the three-part series was the Sherman Antitrust Act 
                                                                
 26. See infra Part II.B.1 and accompanying text (discussing federally regulated industries). 
 27. See infra Part II.D (discussing the precedential Supreme Court cases approving implied antitrust im-
munity). 
 28. See infra Part II.A and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra Part II.D. 
 30. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.  
 31. See infra Part II.B. 
 32. See infra Part II.D.  
 33. See infra Part II.D. 
 34. See infra Part IV.D and accompanying text for information on the continuing importance of antitrust 
laws after the recent financial crisis. 
 35. See infra Part IV.B and accompanying text. 
 36. See generally George Bittlingmayer, Antitrust and Business Activity: The First Quarter Century, 70 BUS. 
HIST. REV. 363, 363 (1996) (arguing that “trust-busting hurt business activity”); Robert H. Bork & Ward S. 
Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 363 (1965); Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust 
Policy, 57 THE AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1967). 
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which was first passed in 1890.37  The purpose of the Sherman Act was to protect 
competition.38  The Act is divided into three sections: Section One bans certain spe-
cific anticompetitive behavior.39  Section Two bans end results that are anticompeti-
tive in nature.40  Section Three extends the first section to U.S. territories and to the 
District of Columbia.41   
The next major antitrust legislation passed by Congress was the Clayton Act in 
1914.42  The Clayton Act aimed to deter anticompetitive43 behavior at early stages of 
                                                                
 37. George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 1 (1985) (discussing the origins 
of the Sherman Act).  
 38. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1979) (discussing 
legal challenges to behavior creating monopoly power). There are two competing theories of antitrust generally 
as reflected by the Sherman Act.  One is an economic rationale, the other is a public welfare or public interest  
rationale. See, e.g. Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Laws and Public Utility Regulation, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
42, 42 (1972) (stating that the antitrust laws are meant to protect competition “from the business behavior . . . 
that endanger[s] competitive processes or threaten[s] to deny society . . . benefits” derived from competition); 
Bork, supra note 36, at 242 (explaining that these two goals (consumer welfare and small business welfare) are 
“mutually inconsistent” ends); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 335, 342 (2004) (explaining that antitrust generally works to fill in the gaps that regulations create by 
preventing anti-competitive tendencies).   
 39. Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)). The text of  § 1 
is as follows:  
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every per-
son who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be 
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment 
not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.” Id. at § 1.  
 40. Id. at § 2. The text of § 2 is as follows:  
“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be pu-
nished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or 
by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court.”  
See also Donald I. Baker, The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice—The Role of Competition in Regulated 
Industries, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 571, 574 (1970) (noting that the Department of Justice mainly uses § 2 
of the Sherman Act when enforcing antitrust laws). 
 41. Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209. The text of § 3 is as follows:  
“Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of 
trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Ter-
ritories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the 
District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is declared illegal. Every person who 
shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 
if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.” Id. 
 42. Clayton Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § § 12–17 (2006), 29 U.S.C. § § 
52–53 (2006). See also Peter C. Dooley, The Interlocking Directorate, 59 THE AM. ECON. REV. 314, 314 (1969). 
 43. Merriam-Webster defines anticompetitive as “tending to reduce or discourage competition.” Anticom-
petitive, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2011), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ anticompetitive.  
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business.44  Specifically, the Act prohibited conduct that was regarded as anticompe-
titive in nature.45 Examples of anticompetitive activities include price discrimina-
tion, exclusive dealings, mergers that substantially diminish competition, and pro-
hibiting the same person from being a director of two competing companies.46 
The third, and final, major antitrust act, amending § 2 of the Clayton Act, was 
the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936.47  Its main provision banned a company from 
selling comparable goods to different buyers at different prices.48 It was the first an-
titrust statute to prohibit price discrimination with the goal of protecting small 
businesses from being edged out of the market by larger corporations.49   
B. Antitrust laws are often at odds with laws regulating federal industries because of 
their conflicting goals: antitrust attempts to preserve competition whereas federal 
regulations attempt to protect the public interest. 
Antitrust laws strive to protect competition.50  Federally regulated industries strive 
to protect the public interest.51 Antitrust laws and federal regulations mostly work in 
tandem and coexist without issue.52 However, because they have dueling purposes, 
antitrust enforcement and federal regulation enforcement sometimes conflict with 
each other.53  Although antitrust laws are statutory in nature, the Court has long 
                                                                
 44. Dooley, supra note 42, at 314 (“The Clayton Act of 1914 prohibited interlocking directorates among 
competing corporations”). 
 45. Clayton Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § § 12–17 (2000), 29 U.S.C. § § 
52–53(2000). 
 46. See A.M. POLLARD AND J.P. DALY, BANKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES §19–25 (3d ed. 2004) (discuss-
ing the standards for determining the presence of anticompetitive behavior during mergers and acquisitions).  
 47. Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 
13 (2006)). Interestingly, this act was passed during the same time as the Securities and Exchange Act. See infra 
note 95 and accompanying text. 
 48. Id. at §13a. However, the Robinson-Patman Act provides for the following exceptions: prices can be 
different to meet the needs of competition, a firm can provide a ‘cost justification’ for the difference in pricing, 
and if there are ‘changed conditions’ in the market, prices can also be different. Id. See also Bork, supra note 36, 
at 244–45 (emphasizing the importance of the ‘predatory intent’ element for a violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act to occur).   
 49. Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address before the Ambit Group Retail Channel Con-
ference for the Computer Industry (June 7, 1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/patman.shtm. 
 50. See supra notes 35–46 and accompanying text. See also Pamela J. Ashley, Comment, Vanishing Immuni-
ty: The Antitrust Assault on Regulated Industries, 27 LOY. L. REV. 187, 187 (1981) (stating that antitrust laws 
promote “free and unrestrained compet tion”). 
 51. See infra Part II.B.1. Also note that the antitrust/regulation debate fits into the broader debate between 
neoclassicism and neo-liberalism economic theories, in which the former avers that competition amongst firms 
in a free market economy is most efficient, whereas the latter avers that regulation controlling monopolies will 
improve the general welfare. Clifford Winston, U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation, 12 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 89, 91 (1998).  
 52. See Areeda, supra note 38, at 53 (stating that antitrust laws and regulations are not mutually exclusive 
because federal courts are responsible for interpreting both); Baker, supra note 40, at 584 (noting that “competi-
tion and regulation do not necessarily serve inconsistent goals”). 
 53. It is also important to remember that because inconsistencies lead to ‘inefficient’ results, there is no 
presumption of Congressional intent to create these inconsistencies. Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 343.  
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recognized their importance in the preservation of America’s market economy and 
has been loath to find an irresoluble conflict between antitrust laws and federal reg-
ulations.54  Nevertheless, the Court has recognized two instances where there anti-
trust immunity is mandated: state action immunity55 and implied immunity.56  In 
the case of implied immunity, the Court has only allowed a narrow version of im-
plied antitrust immunity to be invoked when there is a ‘clear repugnancy’ between 
antitrust laws and regulations in a ‘pervasively’ regulated industry.57 The implied 
antitrust immunity is not granted to the entire industry, rather, it is granted only to 
the extent necessary to make the regulatory scheme workable.58 For example, in 
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,59 the Court held that the exemption 
granted in the Clayton Act for the Federal Trade Commission  was narrow in scope 
and did not extend to asset bank mergers, and thus the bank merger at issue was 
illegal and in violation of antitrust laws.60 In addition, in United States v. Borden 
Company,61 the Court held that there was no implied antitrust immunity under the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act when Chicago milk producers were indicted 
for price fixing and supply limiting of milk.62  
                                                                
 54. Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27, 27 (2003) (quoting 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)).In fact, antitrust has been called the “Magna Carta of 
free enterprise.” Id.(quoting Topco). Even when Congress explicitly provides antitrust immunity to regulated 
industries, such as in interstate commerce and in communications, it does so w thin limited parameters.  See 
George J. Alexander, Antitrust and the Telephone Industry after the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 12 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 227, 243 (1996) (arguing generally that there is no implied antitrust im-
munity under the Telecommunications Act of 1996).  
 55. The state action exemption to antitrust arises when the state takes action in certain regulated areas, 
such as in regulating public utilities, because the Sherman Act exempts government action from antitrust laws. 
See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L. J. 
486, 488 (arguing that the revisionist analysis of state action immunity, stating that courts should narrow its 
scope, is wrong). See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943) (holding that the California Prorate Act was 
exempt from antitrust liab lity and articulated the state action exemption); see also Ashley, supra note 50, at 191 
(discussing the origins of the state action ant trust exemption).   
 56. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. Agencies themselves have been required to take competi-
tion into account when promulgating regulations that might restrict competition and have anti-competitive 
tendencies. Id. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a ‘serious’ anti-competitive effect is adequate to demon-
strate a regulation contrary to the public interest. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Li-
nien, 390 U.S. 238, 252 (1968) (holding that when shipping conference policies conflicted with antitrust laws, 
they would only be allowable if the conflicting policy was evidenced as being a serious transportation need); 
United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 333, 334 (1959)(holding that the FCC needed to consider anti-
trust principles when it interpreted the Communications Act). 
 57. Bruce L. Merman & James P. Hermance, Implication of SEC’s Victory over Antitrust Regulation in the 
Securities Industry: Justice Department’s Suit Against AT&T on the Line, 2 J. CORP. L. 305, 317 (1977) (explaining 
that where antitrust laws can work w thin the regulatory framework proscribed by Congress, the Supreme 
Court have been ‘hesitant’ to find implied immunity).   
 58. See Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 345 (noting that courts only invoke implied antitrust immunity 
when enforcement of antitrust laws would stop the agency from carrying out its operations). 
 59. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 60. Id. at 371. 
 61. 308 U.S. 188 (1939). 
 62. Id. at 192. 
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1. The Federal Government regulates industries to protect the public interest. 
During the Great Depression’s New Deal, a powerful administrative state became 
the cornerstone of the American welfare state.63  Federal agencies were created to 
regulate many aspects of American life, including securities, telecommunications, 
interstate commerce and others.64 This heightened level of federal regulation was a 
major departure from the previous government policy of preserving competition 
and maintaining a laissez-faire approach to economic policy.65 Federal regulation 
was justified as protecting the public interest, and it tended to decrease competition 
amongst firms in an industry.66 In the trying economic times of the Great Depres-
                                                                
 63. See Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 340 (noting that it is the New Deal position that a complex system 
creates consumer ‘vulnerability’ and that New Dealers tried to regulate almost everything because they lost all 
confidence in an open market economy following the Great Depression);  Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depres-
sion, the New Deal, and the American Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723, 727 (1984) (explaining that one major 
consequence of the New Deal was the elevation of the President’s power within the new administrative state 
which has endured to today); Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the 
Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. OF POL. ECON. 779, 779 (2004) (equating the New Deal 
with the “cartelization” of industry, where the government controlled the labor market and wages).  
 64. See Cole & Ohanian, supra note 63, at 783. For instance, the National Labor Relations Act established 
the National Labor Relations Board, which regulated collective bargaining of workers’ unions, price controls 
and wage levels. Id. The Social Security Act was enacted to provide long-term relief to retired Americans. Wil-
bur J. Cohen, The Development of the Social Security Act of 1935: Reflections Some Fifty Years Later, 68 MINN. L. 
R. 379, 382 (1983–1984). See also Edwin Amenta & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Formative Years of U.S. Social 
Spending Policies: Theories of the Welfare State and the American States during the Great Depression, 53 AM. SOC. 
REV. 661, 664 (1988) (arguing that there are three differing rationales for regulation in lieu of market competi-
tion: emergency relief, democratic partisanship political reasons and assisting state capacities to help). The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission was created to increase disclosure of securities and transactions. See Parrish, 
supra note 63, at 727.  The Federal Communications Commission was enacted to regulate communications. 
Harry M. Shooshan and Erwin G. Krasnow, Congress and the Federal Communications Commission: The Contin-
uing Contest for Power, 9 HASTINGS J. COMM. & ENT. L. 619, 619 (exploring the tension between the FCC and 
Congress). 
 65. Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 341 (noting that “[o]ne consequence of regulation is a reduced role for 
the antitrust laws” because market forces are no longer in control). In fact, even in the early days of antitrust law 
before the New Deal, conflict existed between business regulations and antitrust laws. See Parrish, supra note 63, 
at 724. The Act to Regulate Commerce, establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission (which predated the 
Sherman Act by three years) created a monopoly approved by the government regulating, as its name suggests, 
commerce between the states. Id. However, the Court determined that the Commerce Act did not permit pas-
sage of regulations that violated the Sherman Act and skirted the issue.  Id. (noting that the nineteenth century 
laissez-faire economy tended to favor entrepreneurs whereas twentieth century regulations, beginning with the 
New Deal, adapted concepts to fit w thin the new American framework).  
 66. Ashley, supra note 50, at 187 (explaining that regulated industries promote “control and possible eli-
mination” of competition in the name of furthering the public interest).Increased regulation of industries was 
justified as being done in the public interest and for the protection of the people. Id. A common explanation of 
the need for regulation is the rise of a “natural monopoly,” which happens when large economies work most 
efficiently if one company is in charge of a single industry. See J. Baker, supra note 54, at 585, 571 (stating that a 
main justification for government industry regulation is that t serves to ensure “reasonable economic perfor-
mance”). The paradigmatic example of a ‘natural monopoly’ to be regulated is a public utility: the argument 
made is that it is more efficient in a large-scale economy for a heavily regulated public utility to offer water and 
electricity services than it is for several competing companies to competitively offer these services. Id.; Mark 
Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 
871–72, 874 (1973) (arguing that there are inherent contradictions in the natural monopoly justification for 
regulation and that regulation is not consistently completed in the true public interest); Ashley, supra note 50, at 
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sion, legislators were willing to overlook the anti-competitive results of regulation, 
which were troubling to legislators at the end of the nineteenth century, to stabilize 
the economy.67  The 1970’s were the height of regulation in America. Beginning 
with the Reagan Administration, the United States entered a period of deregulation, 
which remains relatively intact today.68  However, regulated industries still play a 
major role in government enforcement in almost every area, including securities, 
the environment, and communications.69 
2. The Court has held that implied antitrust preclusion is only applicable to 
‘pervasively’ regulated federal industries. 
Because the Court is incredibly hesitant to apply implied antitrust immunity to fed-
erally regulated industries, it has consistently only applied such immunity to indus-
tries that have pervasive regulatory schemes in which the agency is able to deter an-
ti-competitive behaviors through its own operations.70 Even if an industry has 
pervasive characteristics, the Court will try and limit the amount of implied anti-
                                                                                                                                                    
187. But note that other theories for regulation exist. For example, the contestability theory asserts that competi-
tion does not have to exist within a market to be successful: it can be equally competitive to have competition 
for a market. See Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 364.   
 67. Cole & Ohanian, supra note 63, at 779 (arguing that there is surprising lack of economic equilibrium 
because of New Deal policies In fact, reducing competition was a stated goal of New Dealers because it stabilized 
price levels which led to a decrease in antitrust enforcement and an increase in government collusion.). Id. A 
major political science argument for New Deal spending during the Depression is that spending was politically 
motivated and influenced by party politics. John Joseph Wallis, Employment, Politics and Economic Recovery 
during the Great Depression, 69 THE REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 516, 516 (1987) (noting that while politics is a 
largely accepted spending justification, responding to the alarming economic situation was still a key factor in 
New Deal spending). See generally Amenta & Carruthers, supra note 64, at 661 (arguing that the statist perspec-
tive for the timing of New Deal passage is most supported by available data). 
 68. Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 341 (explaining that in the deregulation of the past twenty years, anti-
trust has been a major “growth industry”); Winston, supra note 51, at 90 (noting that deregulation is a slow 
process in which currently only minor industries have been able to fully deregulate, such as niche transportation 
industries). The following industries have been deregulated since the 1970’s: the airline industry, the transporta-
tion industry generally and the communications and power industries. Id. A good example of a fully deregu-
lated industry is the airline industry, where once deregulated, competition became fierce. Budget airlines such as 
Southwest and AirTran were able to cut prices and wedge into the profit margins of the old standbys Delta, etc.  
Id. at 93–94 (also arguing that this increase in competition and decrease in regulation has actually created an 
increase in consumer welfare because there has been an improvement in quality of service, a decrease in prices 
and a decrease in operating costs). Id. at 100. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Economic Analysis of the Law 
Approach: The Effects of Deregulation on Competition: The Experience of the United States, 23 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 
S7, S8 (2000) (arguing that because regulation is so pervasive over industries, deregulation stands for the de-
crease in the ‘comprehensive controls’ that the government holds over industries). 
 69. See Robert W. Crandall, Letting Go? The Federal Communications Commission in the Era of Deregula-
tion, 7 R. NETWORK ECON. 481, 483–485 (2008) (noting that the FCC continued regulating the telephone indus-
try well after legislation was passed to deregulate it). Because deregulation is a slow process, many major indus-
tries that were regulated beginning with the New Deal remain regulated today. See Winston, supra note 51, at 
91. Additionally, regulation itself has shifted from being seen as a mutually exclusive alternative to competition 
to regulating only when compet tion takes place. See Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and Im-
munities as Applied to Deregulated Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 761, 762 (2006). 
 70. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682–85 (1975) (discussed infra at notes 135–42 and 
accompanying text). 
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trust immunity it grants to the industry in light of regulatory framework being chal-
lenged.71 To determine if an industry is pervasively regulated, the Court looks to the 
protections triggered by the regulatory scheme, how extensive agency controls are 
over the entire industry and if regulatory controls can be used in lieu of enforce-
ment of antitrust laws.72  There is no bright line test which the Court employs to 
make this determination; it is rather a case-by-case inquiry in which the Court 
strives to make the bottom line decision as to whether the regulatory scheme pro-
poses a ‘clear repugnancy’ to the enforcement of antitrust laws.73 
Before deregulation began in the 1980s,74 there were numerous cases arguing for 
implied antitrust immunity because of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme where 
the Court determined under a case-by-case inquiry whether implied antitrust im-
munity would be applied.75  For example, in Pan Am. World Airways Inc. v. United 
States,76 the Court held that under the Federal Aviation Act, antitrust suits were 
barred because there was a pervasive regulatory scheme in place and because the Act 
specifically granted the Civil Aeronautics Board jurisdiction over antitrust claims in 
lieu of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.77 The Court, in Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 
v. RCA Comm’ns, Inc.,78  also held that an FCC order mandating competition 
amongst telecommunications carriers was not legitimate under the pervasive com-
munications regulatory scheme and therefore narrowly applied implied antitrust 
immunity to the communications industry.79   
However, even during the period of heightened federal regulation, the Court’s 
application of implied antitrust immunity was still narrow, and it refused to extend 
the implied immunity where the regulatory scheme was not pervasive.80  For in-
stance, in the banking industry, in United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank,81 the 
Court held that the Bank Merger Act of 1940 section being challenged did not prec-
lude an antitrust suit from moving forward because the limited powers granted to 
the agency in the regulatory statute did not allow the agency to oversee antitrust-
                                                                
 71. Id. at 682.  See also supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
 72. See generally Merman & Hermance, supra note 57, at 305  (expounding on the antitrust challenges both 
within and outside of the securities industry). See also Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275 (2007). 
 73. See infra notes 74–88 and accompanying text. 
 74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text for a discussion of deregulation. 
 75. See infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 76. 371 U.S. 296 (1963). 
 77. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963) (noting the statute specifically 
states that persons affected under certain aeronautics regulations under the Board are “relieved from” the anti-
trust acts). 
 78. 346 U.S. 86 (1953). 
 79. Id. at 96 (further noting that even though there was a national policy in favor of competition, it was not 
enough to trigger antitrust laws). 
 80. See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
 81. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
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like claims.82  The Court also refused to apply implied antitrust immunity in anoth-
er area of the communications industry: in United States v. Radio Corp. of Am.,83 the 
Court determined that an antitrust claim under the Sherman Act was allowable be-
cause the Federal Communications Act did not create a pervasive regulatory scheme 
in which antitrust would ruin the regulatory scheme envisioned by Congress.84  
Then again in Ottertail Power Co. v. United States,85 the Court held that implicit re-
peal of antitrust laws did not extend to the regulatory power of the Federal Power 
Commission.86 In  Federal Maritime Comm’n. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,87 the Court held 
that even though the Shipping Act provided antitrust immunity in some instances, 
it did not extend to the specific government acquisition in question because the 
Federal Maritime Commission did not pervasively regulate the activity in ques-
tion.88 
In the one major implied antitrust immunity case since the deregulation of the 
communications industry, the Court, in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offic-
es of Curtis V. Trinko,89 held that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not create 
a repeal of antitrust laws because a savings clause existed that specifically prohibited 
a finding of implied antitrust immunity.90  
 
 
 
                                                                
 82. Id. at 321.  Compare Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963), with su-
pra note 76. 
 83. 358 U.S. 334 (1959). 
 84. Id. at 334.  The Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the FCA’s legislative history before concluding 
that Congress did not intend to give the FCC jurisdiction to override antitrust suits.  Id. at 338–346. But note 
that the Court also reiterated in this case that the FCA’s regulatory scheme could be seen as pervasive in other 
specific sections that might bar antitrust suits in the future.  Id. 
 85. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 86. Id. at 374. The Court noted that just because the Federal Power Commission maintained regulatory 
authority in a specific area, it did not mean automatic antitrust immunity was triggered. Id. More specifically, 
the Court stated that “Congress rejected a pervasive regulatory scheme for controlling the interstate distribution 
of power in favor of voluntary commercial relationships.”  Id. at 374.   Because Congress rejected a pervasive 
regulatory scheme, antitrust immunity would not be extended. See also Merman & Hermance, supra note 57, at 
327.   
 87. 411 U.S. 726 (1973). 
 88. Id. at 740. Here, the FMC had approved the purchase of an entire fleet by a common nautical carrier to 
another common carrier. The Court stated that Congress did not intend to immunize the asset acquisition 
agreements that would require continuous management by the FMC from antitrust claims. Id. 
 89. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 90. Id. at 398. The Telecommunications Act imposed sharing duties onto local exchange carriers (LEC’s) in 
a “detailed regulatory scheme” Id. at 406. The specific savings clause was as follows: “Section 601(b)(1) of the 
1996 Act is an antitrust specific saving clause providing that ‘nothing in this Act or the amendments made by 
this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the ant trust laws.’” Id. at 
406 (quoting 110 Stat. 143, 47 U.S.C. § 152)). But see notes 201–03 and accompanying text for Justice Thomas’s 
discussion of a pertinent savings clause in the securities regulatory scheme. 
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C. Securities laws present a ‘pervasively’ federally regulated industry which also relies 
heavily on antitrust enforcement, except in the instance of narrow implied immunity. 
1. The history of Securities Laws demonstrates the government’s intent to create a 
pervasive regulatory structure in the securities industry. 
Securities laws were one of the many regulative results of the Great Depression.91  
Before the stock market crash of 1929, the market experienced a boom where there 
was a large amount of market manipulation by bankers and corporations.92  After 
the market crashed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal government de-
cided to reign in the securities markets.93 
In March, 1932, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency reviewed the 
state of the securities industry and the stock exchange and determined that regula-
tion was needed.94  The Securities Act and the Securities and Exchange Act were 
passed in 1933 and 1934, respectively, following these hearings.95 
The main goal of the securities laws was to ensure full disclosure of financial in-
formation.96  This full financial disclosure was aimed at increasing ethics and ac-
countability in the financial industry and allowing businesses to recover, thereby 
                                                                
 91. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1223–24 (1999); see Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking 
the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725, 761 (2003) (arguing that the self-regulation as-
pect of securities laws which attempted to self-police caused problems such as the Enron scandal). See generally 
James Burk, The Origins of Federal Securities Regulation: A Case Study in the Social Control of Finance, 63 SOC. F. 
1010, 1010 (1985) (arguing that the securities acts were established because of appearance of market failure, 
electoral politics and because of politically contingent events).  
 92. Williams, supra note 91, at 1224. Additionally, before 1929, securities regulation was left up to individ-
ual states to determine. Markham, supra note 91, at 730. This delegation of power allowed trusts to continue 
operating and risky economic practices to take place. Id. For example, New Jersey laws allowed corporations to 
maintain holding companies, which therefore allowed trusts such as Standard Oil to legally operate. Id. Because 
of this, antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act did not initially affect securities to a great degree.  See id. at 734. 
 93. Williams, supra note 91, at 1223. One commentator has likened the passage of the securities laws to a 
“revolution” instead of the “gradual . . . evolution” that occurred prior to the Great Depression. Amar Bhide, 
The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31, 34 (1993) (quoting Charles Meyer). 
 94. Williams, supra note 91, at 1223–24. The Pecora hearings are named for Ferdinand Pecora, who was 
the Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate's Committee on Banking and Currency.  The Pecora Hearings found that 
there were several pre-market crash securities practices that needed to be curbed.  These are mainly excess spec-
ulation, wash sales, matched orders and short sales.  Id. at 1224–25. 
 95. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 96. Williams, supra note 91, at 1226–27. The laws were also passed to prevent another Great Depression-
sized market crash in the future. Id. Additionally, Congress made a policy choice to “reassert” control over mo-
nies that had benefitted only a small percentage of wealthy people to the ‘detriment of m llions’ of Americans.  
Id. at 1227.  The full disclosure goal was further designed to allow an investor to make intelligent, fact-based 
decisions on which securities he was investing in and their true value, as well as to “safeguard against the negli-
gent and fraudulent practices perpetrated upon [the investor]…by incompetent and unscrupulous bankers, 
underwriters, dealers, and issuers.” Markham, supra note 91, at 739 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1455 (1934)). Inves-
tors were protected by the securities acts in three main ways: full disclosure of securities information, the dis-
couraging of unfair use of insider information, and the elimination of sudden price fluctuations.  See Bhide, 
supra note 93, at 34.  
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helping those in financial need.97  By having to make full disclosures of their balance 
sheets and internal books, businesses could not practice the same exceedingly risky 
behavior they did before 1929.98 This in turn increased market efficiency because 
investors could determine through firms’ transparency if their investments were 
fairly safe or risky ventures.99 
2. The content of the Securities Laws created a pervasive regulatory structure. 
The Securities Act of 1933 was passed on May 27, 1933.100  It put the burden of full 
disclosure of securities being offered for sale to those selling the securities.101  The 
main enforcement mechanisms were parameters for information disclosure and 
harsh penalties for lack of compliance.102 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was passed on June 6, 1934.103  The Act 
regulated speculative trading of securities and prohibited bankers from simulta-
neously holding commercial and investment functions in the same institution and 
prohibited bad practices.104  Perhaps most importantly, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) was established to provide oversight of securities and to pro-
mote the “fair market” and “market efficiency.”105  The SEC was granted, and con-
tinues to have, broad self-regulatory power over the securities industry.106 The SEC 
regulates virtually every area of the securities industry: it regulates underwriting ac-
tivities, IPO activities, supervises the system of self-government,107 regulates securi-
                                                                
 97. Burk, supra note 91, at 1014. Specifically, this material aid went to giving the public help with loans, 
financing mortgages and agricultural land and create jobs. Id. 
 98. See Bhide, supra note 93, at 31 (noting that the securities laws were meant to restore public confidence, 
protect investors and create “orderly markets”); Markham, supra note 91, at 729 (noting the same). 
 99. Markham, supra note 91, at 729. 
 100. Burk, supra note 91, at 1012.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. Among the prohibited practices were wash sales, matched orders, and supplying false informa-
tion. Id. at 1013. 
 105. Id. at 1012. The SEC accomplished this through registering securities (taking over this function from 
the Federal Trade Commission), monitoring rules and guaranteeing that stock exchanges complied with the 
new regulations. Id. Although basic in its inception, the SEC has continually expanded since its passage. Bhide, 
supra note 93, at 35.  
 106. See Richard W. Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 29 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 663, 664 (1964) (discussing the broad self-regulatory authority 
the SEC possesses over the securities industry). 
 107. See id. (noting that while self-regulating institutions such as the NASD have some responsibly, the SEC 
“is assigned the task of supervising the operation of this system of self-government”). The system of self-
government includes voluntary registration by brokers and securities firms with self-regulating bodies, mainly 
the Federal Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). About FINRA, FINRA, www.finra.org/aboutFINRA/. Note 
that FINRA represents the 2007 merger between NASD and the New York Stock Exchange and is now the self-
regulating organization responsible for regulating activities by registered brokers and firms. See Carrie Johnson, 
SEC Approves One Watchdog for Brokers Big and Small, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 27, 2007, at 1. However, 
FINRA is still subject to SEC supervision. Id. 
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ties rules enacted, ensures fair dealing between brokers and firms, and imposes 
sanctions when fair practices have been violated.108  It has an almost unparalleled 
level of control over the securities industry.109 
D. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Silver, Gordon and NASD proscribe the narrow 
set of circumstances in which the securities laws have implied immunity from antitrust 
laws. 
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,110 the Supreme Court established the frame-
work to determine when, and if, securities laws are immune from antitrust laws.111  
The Court established in Silver the ‘clear repugnancy’ test: antitrust laws would be 
implicitly precluded only when there was a clear repugnancy between the antitrust 
laws and the securities laws in question.112  In Silver, the Court found a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act when the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), an entity su-
pervised by the SEC, discontinued use of private wires set up in the NYSE offices for 
instant communication because this activity directly violated § 1 of the Sherman 
Act.113 The Court also held that there was no implied immunity to antitrust laws be-
cause the NYSE was not liable to the non-member broker-dealer.114   
Although the Court determined that in this instance antitrust laws were not im-
pliedly repealed, it identified the ‘clear repugnancy’ test.115 The Court stated that 
when determining if antitrust laws are impliedly precluded, the goal of antitrust 
laws to preserve competition must be weighed against the public-policy goal of se-
curities laws to self-regulate.116 Self-regulation in the securities industry might lead 
to anti-competitive results, as certain securities regulations actually encourage be-
havior deemed inappropriate by the federal antitrust statutes.117  When this hap-
pens, antitrust laws must be found to be impliedly precluded because the SEC en-
courages, and regulates, anticompetitive behavior.118 For example, the SEC creates 
rules and regulations governing the actions of exchange member firms and bro-
kers.119  In these rules, the SEC allows member firms and brokers to engage in trad-
ing, which if applied in normal circumstances would be “inconsistent with just and 
                                                                
 108. Jennings, supra note 106, at 664.  
 109. See id. at 663–73 (discussing the SEC’s broad regulatory powers). 
 110. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
 111. Id. at 357. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 347. 
 114. Id. at 341. Silver was the non-member broker-dealer who had installed his private wires in the NYSE.  
Id. at 343. 
 115. Silver, 373 U.S. at 357.  
 116. Id. at 349. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 349, 358–59. 
 119. Id. at 353. See supra notes 101–10 and accompanying text. 
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equitable principles of trade.”120 The Court noted that many of the regulations 
promulgated by the SEC in its self-regulation efforts deal with interactions between 
exchange members and non-members.121  In this particular case, the Court stated 
that while the self-regulation of the NYSE in removing private wires was a per se vi-
olation of the Sherman Act, antitrust laws were not precluded because there was no 
‘clear repugnancy’ between the antitrust laws and the SEC’s self-regulating of the 
NYSE.122 
Twelve years after Silver, the Court decided two cases in the same year that fur-
ther developed and clarified the ‘clear repugnancy’ test established in Silver: Nation-
al Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc.123 and Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.124  
These two cases further illustrated how the Court determines whether implied anti-
trust immunity exists in certain areas of the securities industry.125 
In United States v. National Ass’n  of Securities Dealers, Inc.(NASD),126 the Court 
found that the Maloney Act’s § 22(f) conferred regulatory authority to the SEC that 
impliedly precluded enforcement of the Sherman Act antitrust laws.127  The Court 
asserted that the requisite ‘clear repugnancy’ was present in this instance because it 
was necessary to preclude enforcement of the antitrust laws to allow the securities 
regulatory scheme function in any capacity.128  Unlike in Silver, the SEC’s mutual 
fund regulations could not be effective if the federal antitrust laws were applied to 
them because of the anticompetitive nature of the SEC’s regulations.129 In NASD, 
the government brought suit against NASD alleging that the NASD, mutual funds, 
mutual fund underwriters, and broker-dealers violated § 1 of the Sherman Act 
when they “combined and agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices of mu-
tual-fund shares in secondary market transactions between dealers,” investors, and 
brokered transactions.130 The Court further held that if antitrust laws were not im-
plicitly precluded in this instance, the NASD would be subjected to “duplicative and 
                                                                
 120. Id. at 355. For example, the SEC allows member firms and brokers to trade in the over-the-counter 
market and deal in listed securities, which increases the potential for the “loss to the principal in the transac-
tion.”  Id. at 354–355. 
 121. Silver, 373 U.S. at 354. 
 122. Id. at 364. 
 123. 422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See infra notes 71–91 and accompanying text (illustrating how the Court determines whether implied 
antitrust immunity exists). 
 126. 422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
 127. Id. at 694. Specifically, the Court determined that mutual fund sales were exempt from antitrust. Id. 
The Maloney Act, which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1834, allows security brokers to self-regulate 
in the over-the-counter mutual fund market. Id.  
 128. Id. at 734 (quoting Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1975)).   
 129. Id. at 722–23. Specifically, the Investment Company Act governing mutual fund transactions included 
restrictions on their distribution as well as limitations on the funds’ face value, in direct conflict with antitrust 
provisions. Id.  
 130. Id. at 694. 
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inconsistent” standards defining what was legal action in the mutual fund market131 
which would be dangerous to the overall functioning of the mutual fund process.132  
Section 22(f) of the Maloney Act specifically allowed mutual funds to create restric-
tions on negotiability and transferability of shares, which was in direct conflict with 
antitrust’s goal of preserving competition.133  It was thus necessary to for the Court 
to apply implied antitrust immunity in this narrow area of securities law.134 
In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,135 the Supreme Court determined that the 
NYSE’s practice of using fixed commission rates for its members impliedly prec-
luded the application of federal antitrust laws because the SEC had direct authority 
to approve or disapprove of exchange commission rates.136  In Gordon, the Court 
further refined the clear repugnancy standard by enumerating several factors which 
should be considered when determining if antitrust laws are implicitly repealed in 
regards to securities laws.137  The Court reiterated that antitrust laws should be im-
plicitly precluded only in narrow circumstances and only when a clear repugnancy 
existed between the securities regulations in question and the antitrust laws.138  The 
                                                                
 131. One standard from the SEC regulations, and the other standard from the antitrust laws. 
 132. NASD, 422 U.S. at 735. 
 133. Id. at 720–21. 
 134. Id. at 719. However, the Court found that § 22(d) of the Maloney Act did not implicitly preclude anti-
trust laws in the same way as § 22(f). Section 22(d) prohibited mutual funds from selling shares at other than 
the current public offering price unless done so through an underwriter. Id. The Court determined that if read 
in a ‘reasonable manner,’ § 22(d) could be reconciled with the antitrust laws and work in tandem and thus there 
was no implicit preclusion. Id.  
 135. 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
 136. Id. at 659. Specifically, there was an allegation that the fixed commission rates violated Sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for Sherman Act discussion. However, the NYSE 
had always fixed its commission rates to prevent competition amongst its members. Gordon, 422 U.S. at 665–66.  
The Securities and Exchange Act gave the SEC the power to fix and ensure ‘reasonable’ commission rates in 
Section 19(b). Id. Section 19(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act is as follows: 
The Commission is further authorized, if . . .  the Commission determines that such exchange has 
not made the changes so requested, and that such changes are necessary or appropriate for the pro-
tection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon such exchange or to insure 
fair administration of such exchange, by rules or regulations or by order to alter or supplement the 
rules of such exchange . . . the fixing of reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing, and other 
charges. 
 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (enacted June 6, 1934), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a. After con-
ducting several studies into the fixed commission rate practices, the SEC thought that competition decided that 
competition would be a better protection than fixed commission rates, and Congress enacted new legislation 
codifying the SEC’s findings. However, the SEC retained discretion to re-impose the fixed rates.  Gordon, 422 
U.S. at 669–75. See also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11019, Doc.App. 60 (Sept. 19, 1974).  
 137. Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682.  
 138. Id. (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350–51  (1963). See supra note 83 
for more information on Philadelphia Nat’l Bank.  See also Gordon, 422 U.S. at 683 (citing Hughes Tool Co. v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (holding that the Civil Aeronautics Board maintained antitrust 
immunity under the Federal Aviation Act for transactions under its pervasive regulatory scheme)); Carnation 
Co. v. Pacific Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966) (holding that there was no antitrust immunity for unlawful 
rulemaking agreements not approved by the Federal Maritime Commission); U.S. v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 
207 (1939) (holding that the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 did not repeal the Sherman Act for 
milk producers not operating under the Secretary of Agriculture). 
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Court also stated that implied antitrust immunity should be found only when ne-
cessary to make the regulatory scheme operable and should be applied to the mini-
mum extent possible.139  The Court then laid forth the pertinent factors to evaluate 
when determining if antitrust should be impliedly repealed. First, does the SEC 
have pervasive authority over the regulatory scheme in question?140  Second, would 
the regulatory scheme be “unduly interfer[ed]” with if antitrust laws were in 
force?141  Third, would there be incompatible standards resulting if both the securi-
ties laws and the antitrust laws were allowed to operate in tandem?142 
E. The regulatory response to the financial crisis has been swift, but it has not been as 
extensive as the response following the Great Depression. 
Since 2007, the United States experienced the most prolonged economic recession 
since the Great Depression.143  The U.S. economy is still in the early recovery stages 
from this recession, with unemployment consistently hovering around ten percent 
and retail sales down sharply.144  In brief, one major cause of the financial crisis was 
the over-speculation during the housing bubble.145  
                                                                
 139. Gordon, 422 U.S. at 682 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1975)). 
 140. Id. at 683–84. In Gordon, the Court determined that the SEC maintained pervasive authority over the 
approval of commission exchange rates utilized by the exchange. Id. at 681. The SEC maintained final say in the 
use of commission rates. Id. at 681. 
 141. Id. at 685–86. Again in Gordon, the Court held that if federal antitrust laws were applied to the ex-
change’s fixed commission rates, the SEC’s regulatory framework for these rates could not operate, and would 
result in their being interfered with unduly. Id. at 685–86. 
 142. Id. at 686, 688. In Gordon, the Court held that the SEC was given direct authority over commission rate 
practices. Id. at 689. Additionally, allowing antitrust enforcement would unduly interfere with the regulatory 
scheme established. Id. Finally, there would be inconsistent standards if antitrust was not repealed because “the 
sole aim of antitrust legislation [was] to protect competition, whereas the SEC must consider, in addition, the 
economic health of the investors, the exchanges and the securities industry.” Id.; See also infra Part IV.A. 
 143. Gallup finds U.S. Unemployment at 10.0% in Mid-October, GALLUP.COM (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/143714/gallup-finds-unemployment-mid-october.aspx. In March 2009, the reces-
sion was entering its seventeenth consecutive month.  Chris Isidore, The Great Recession, CNNMONEY.COM 
(Mar. 25, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/news/economy/depression _comparisons/index.htm. See 
also Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Econ. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Competition Poli-
cy in Distressed Industries: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the ABA Antitrust Symposium: Competition as 
Public Policy, 16 (May 13, 2009) (noting that this is the “sharpest downturn” since the Great Depression).  See 
generally Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 77 (2009). 
 144. Isidore, supra note 143. 86% of industries decreased their production, and for the first time ever, un-
employment increased in every state in 2009. Id.   
 145. Victoria Ivashina and David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008 1(EFA 2009 
Bergen Meetings Paper, July 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1297337 (noting that contributing 
factors included the sub-prime mortgage problem, the bank failures and the failures and government takeovers 
of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG). These fa lures led to huge increases in banking costs for borrowing, and 
the market became very unstable. Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve and the Finan-
cial Crisis of 2007-2008, 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14134, June 2008). Another 
problem was that lending by banks to consumers and corporate entities also decreased across the board. Id. In 
fact, in the fourth quarter of 2008, corporate lending was forty-seven percent lower than in the third quarter 
and a full seventy-nine percent lower than it was at the height of 2007.  Id. at 2. Lending also took a dive because 
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The financial crisis was further complicated by the downfall of several of Ameri-
ca’s top investment firms, leading to a continued loss of confidence in the U.S. 
market.146  In March 2008, Bear Stearns collapsed,147 followed shortly by Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008,148 setting off a domino effect of bank failures and mer-
gers.149  The result of this has been the consolidation of the securities industry—
currently, there are only a handful of investment banks left standing, holding most 
of the assets and bargaining power.150  
Finally, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,151 
signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010, provides new rules with 
which the banking industry must comply.152 One stated goal of the legislation is to 
end “Too Big To Fail.”153 To avoid creating a mortgage lending meltdown like the 
                                                                                                                                                    
there was a “substantial increase in credit risk” for banks: basically, it was more probable that borrowers would 
default on their loans than it was previously. Id. Additionally, it became difficult to for both credit ratings agen-
cies (Moody’s, etc.) to value several complex securities, such as subprime mortgages. Id. at 11. The subprime 
mortgage fiasco was the ball that set the crisis in motion. There was a decade-long housing bubble, during 
which Americans bough houses they could not afford with low interest rates and floating mortgage rates. Law-
rence J. White, Commentary, Financial Regulation and the Current Crisis: A Guide for the Antitrust Community 
32 (Am. Antitrust Inst., 2008). After these mortgages went through, they were given high ratings by agencies, 
bundled with securities and sold to investors. Id. There was an industry-wide blind eye turned towards the im-
prudence of these mortgages, at least partially motivated by the high transaction fees being paid to intermedia-
ries. Id.  See Anil K. Kashyap et al., Rethinking Capital Regulation, in MAINTAINING STABILITY IN A CHANGING 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A SYMPOSIUM 431, 437 (2009) (explaining that a “key factor” in the recession was the fact 
that it is difficult to see if a corporate manager is adjusting for risk with profits or if the risk is concentrating 
itself). 
 146. See Kashyap et al., supra note 145, at 431  (noting that one  “proximate cause” of the recession was the 
“interplay” between banking choices about mortgage-backed securities and short-term market borrowing).  
 147. John Vickers, The Financial Crisis and Competition Policy: Some Economics, GLOBAL COMPETITION 
POLICY MAGAZINE (Dec. 15, 2008), available at  www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org. The reason for Bear Stearns’s 
collapse is complicated. In brief, the company’s “liquidity pool” had drastically decreased from $18 billion to $2 
billion in only four short days. Cecchetti, supra note 145, at 17. Had Bear Stearns gone bankrupt, the result 
would have been “catastrophic” for the remainder of the banking system because of the investment bank’s 
complex relationships with the entire system.  Id. Because of this, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York made a 
direct loan to Bear Stearns, and then it allowed JP Morgan Chase to purchase Bear Stearns. Id.  
 148. Vickers, supra note 147.   
 149. One law professor has likened the ensuing bank mergers to “buy[ing] when there [was] blood on the 
streets.” Sharon E. Foster, Fire Sale: The Situational Ethics of Antitrust Law in an Economic Crisis, 78 MISS. L.J. 
777, 777 (2009). There was a myriad of bank mergers following the collapse of Bear Stearns. For example, Bank 
of America acquired Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley acquired Bear Stearns, Wells Fargo ac-
quired Wachovia and Lloyds of London acquired HBOS. Id. at 777–78. 
 150. See James Suriwiecki, Why Banks Stay Big, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 2 2009, at 46 (noting that the four 
largest banks—Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup  and Wells Fargo—have actually gotten larger 
during the crisis). 
 151. Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).  
 152. See generally Marcia Clemmitt, Financial Industry Overhaul: Will the New Law Avert Another Crisis?, 20 
CQ RESEARCHER 631 (2010). James Barth & John Jahera, United States Enacts Sweeping Financial Reform Legisla-
tion, 2 J. FIN. ECON. POLICY 192, 193 (2010).  
 153. Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). “Too Big to Fail” is a concept under which financial institutions, such as 
banks and mortgage lenders, were viewed as too large of players to fail because if they did, they would simulta-
neously cause the collapse of their investors, creditors, employees and their entire industries. See Tim Fernholz, 
The Myth of Too Big to Fail, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 28, 2009), available at 
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one experienced in 2008, banks will be restricted in how much consumer money 
they can use when speculating in financial markets.154 The SEC will also undertake a 
study to determine if the creation of a federal ratings board is feasible or useful.155  
Whereas hedge funds were largely unregulated before the 2008 crisis, hedge funds 
that contain over $100 million must now register with the SEC.156 The new legisla-
tion additionally creates many new regulatory oversight bodies.157  The Financial 
Stability Oversight Council will determine if systemic risks are present in the finan-
cial industry.158 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will regulate the me-
thods and information given out by firms to consumers.159 The Office of Credit Rat-
ing Agencies will be created as a subdivision of the SEC and will “provide oversight 
for credit ratings agencies.”160 
Even though the legislation is brand new, criticism has already been voiced.161  
For one, critics comment that while the legislation creates many new regulatory 
checks, it still “depends” on the same regulators who did not take any preventative 
action before the 2008 crisis.162  Another major criticism of the legislation is that it 
does not address reforms of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.163  
III. The Court’s Reasoning 
In Billing v. Credit Suisse of First Boston Ltd.,164 the Supreme Court of the United 
States overturned the Second Circuit’s decision and held that there was a ‘clear re-
pugnancy’ between securities laws and antitrust laws and that securities laws impli-
citly precluded underwriting syndicates from being liable under antitrust claims.165 
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer stated that there are two instances when 
antitrust claims are precluded: when a statute explicitly precludes antitrust claims 
and when the relationship between antitrust laws and the regulatory program is 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_myth_of_too_big_to_fail (noting that  too big to fail is inhe-
rently "systemically risky”). See also Barth and Jahera, supra note 152 (“Clearly, the law represents, at a mini-
mum, a move towards greater and stricter regulation of the financial industry in the United States  in the hope 
of minimizing, if not preventing, the severity of any future crises in our financial markets.”). 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. at 195. 
 156. Id. at 196. 
 157. See Clemmitt, supra note 152, at 636 (describing oversight of the Federal Reserve and overseeing insur-
ers, hedge funds and private equity funds). 
 158. Barth & Jahera, supra note 152, at 194. This Council will be comprised of nine members from various 
federal agencies, and it will be housed at the Federal Reserve. Id. 
 159. Id. at 195. 
 160. Id. at 197. 
 161. See infra notes 162 and accompanying text. 
 162. Nin-Hai Tseng, Bayh: How Financial Reform Could Impede Growth, CNNMONEY.COM (July 
26,2010),http://money.cnn.com /2010/07/26/news/economy/bayh_financial_reform.fortune/index.htm.  
 163. See Barth & Jahera, supra note 152, at 195.  
 164. 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 165. Id. at 285. 
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such that the Court decides that antitrust claims are impliedly precluded.166  Since 
the statute in question here did not explicitly preclude antitrust claims, Justice 
Breyer noted that it was therefore up to the Court to determine if the requisite re-
pugnant relationship existed for antitrust claims to be implicitly precluded.167 
Justice Breyer first recognized that the Court has been reluctant to find implicit 
preclusion.168  He then discussed the three narrow Supreme Court decisions dealing 
specifically with implicit preclusion of antitrust: Silver, Gordon, and NASD.169  
Justice Breyer stated that in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,170 the Supreme 
Court stated that antitrust laws are impliedly repealed only when such repeal is “ne-
cessary to make the Securities Exchange Act remain work, and even then, only to 
the minimum extent necessary.”171 
Justice Breyer then restated the three-part test the Supreme Court established in 
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange.172 The Court stated that there must be a ‘plain 
repugnancy’ between the antitrust and securities law in question and the following 
three factors must be met: (1) the SEC must have direct regulatory power over the 
precluded area of regulation, (2) the SEC must have taken an active role in regulat-
ing the activity, and (3) if antitrust laws were to remain in force, there would be 
‘conflicting standards’ that would ensue.173   
Justice Breyer noted that in the final case in this series, NASD,174 the Supreme 
Court held that because the securities laws and antitrust laws were in direct conflict, 
there was a ‘clear repugnancy’ and therefore antitrust laws were implicitly prec-
luded.175   
Justice Breyer employed a four-factor test, based on the Gordon test, to the case 
at bar.  The following four factors must be met for antitrust laws to be implicitly 
precluded: 
[T]he existence of regulatory authority under the securities law to supervise 
the activities in question; 
[E]vidence that the responsible regulatory entities exercise that authority; 
                                                                
 166. Id. at 270–71.   
 167. Id. at 271. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
 171. Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 271–72 (2007) (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 
U.S. 341, 347 (1963)). In Silver, the Court held that antitrust laws were not implicitly precluded. See supra notes 
111–15 and accompanying text. 
 172. 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
 173. Billing, 551 U.S. at 276–77 (quoting Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 685 (1975)).  
 174. 422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
 175. Billing, 551 U.S. at 276. 
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[A] resulting risk that the securities and antitrust laws, if both applicable, 
would produce conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or 
standards of conduct; 
[T]hat this possible conflict [area] affected practices that lie squarely within 
an area of financial market activity that the securities law seeks to regu-
late.176 
Justice Breyer stated that factors one, two and four were easily met here.177  The 
underwriting activities were joint efforts and the antitrust claims in question were at 
the “very heart” of the securities regulatory authority over underwriting.178  The SEC 
held the authority to supervise the underwriting process.179  Furthermore, the SEC 
continuously exercised its authority in this area of regulation.180 
The main avenue of inquiry to determine if antitrust was implicitly precluded 
was the incompatibly of standards factor.181  This particular factor has a two-
pronged analysis: (1) there must be a substantial risk for injury and (2) there must 
be a minimal need for antitrust enforcement.182  Justice Breyer explained that both 
of these elements were present here.183 
Justice Breyer noted that there was a substantial risk for injury if antitrust laws 
were not found to be implicitly repealed.184  The substantial risk for injury arose out 
of four separate justifications.185  First, there was a need for experts in underwrit-
ing.186  Expert judgment is necessary in underwriting because someone unfamiliar 
with the syndicate process would most likely have a problem deciding if activities 
were illegal or legal.187  Second, there would be overlapping evidence in determining 
the legality of the underwriting activities that could result in substantial injury to 
both the underwriters and the securities purchasers.188  Third, there would be incon-
sistent judgments throughout the court system regarding underwriting activities 
                                                                
 176. Id.  at 275–76. 
 177. Id. at 277. 
 178. Id. at 276. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 277. For instance, the SEC defined the underwriting process, it defined what road shows can in-
clude, it has brought action against violators and it offered private litigation to remedy situations. Id.  
 181. Id.  at 277. 
 182. Id. at 282–84. 
 183. Id. at 283. 
 184. Id. at 279. 
 185. See infra notes 186–90 and accompanying text. 
 186. Billing, 551 U.S. at 279. Justice Breyer expanded this thought by reasoning that there is a fine line be-
tween behavior approved by the SEC and prohibited behavior. Id. The practice of laddering was used as a prime 
example. Id.   
 187. Id. at 278–79. 
 188. See id. at 280. Overlapping evidence in this context means that the evidence demonstrating the illegality 
of certain underwriting activities could simultaneously demonstrate the legality of such activities. See id. 
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and antitrust violations.189  Fourth, applying antitrust laws to underwriting practices 
would be unusually likely to cause economic harm because if antitrust laws were 
enforced in this area, there would be a “chilling effect” on joint underwriting activi-
ty which would potentially cause “serious harm to the efficient functioning of the 
securities market.”190  Because of these four potential injuries, Justice Breyer con-
cluded that there was no method of targeting unlawful securities activities through 
the use of antitrust laws.191   
Justice Breyer also concluded that the second prong of the incompatibility factor, 
the minimal need for antitrust enforcement, was also satisfied.192  Private parties 
themselves can litigate and find remedies without resorting to bringing antitrust 
claims.193  The SEC regulates underwriting activity, and the SEC is required to take 
into account preserving competition when it creates its regulations.194   
The majority thus concluded that antitrust laws were impliedly precluded from 
being applied to underwriting securities activities.195 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment.196  He argued that the IPO agreements 
were “pro-competitive” joint ventures as defined by the Sherman Act.197  Since the 
Sherman Act allows these types of joint ventures, antitrust laws could still apply, 
and the underwriting activities in question could continue without interruption be-
cause there would not be injury to competition as defined by the antitrust laws.198  
Justice Stevens would hold that antitrust laws were not violated as opposed to anti-
trust laws being precluded.199 
Justice Thomas dissented in the opinion.200  Justice Thomas argued that both the 
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act have broad savings clauses which 
preserve rights and remedies.201  Justice Thomas asserted that the majority’s opinion 
did not take these into account and therefore the antitrust claims could have and 
should have proceeded.202 
                                                                
 189. Id. at 281. Since antitrust claims are made in courts throughout the country, judges who do not have 
securities expertise would be likely to create conflicting standards and decisions, especially because the securities 
inquiry is very fact specific. 
 190. Id. at 282–83. 
 191. Id. at 281. 
 192. Id. at 283. 
 193. Id. at 283. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 287. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at 287 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 198. Id. at 287. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 287. (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 201. Id. Specifically, Justice Thomas enumerated § 16 of the Securities Act, which states that the rights and 
remedies provided . . . shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or equi-
ty.” Id.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(a). 
 202. See id. at 289. 
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IV. Analysis 
In Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing,203 the Supreme Court held that antitrust laws 
were implicitly repealed by securities regulations when there is a clear repugnancy 
between the two.204  This further refinement of the Court’s previous narrow findings 
of implied preclusion of antitrust is consistent with the goals of both antitrust and 
securities laws. While several commentators have suggested that the Billing decision 
will open the proverbial floodgates for judicial findings of implied antitrust immun-
ity,205 this will not occur. It is unlikely that the Billing decision will be applied to oth-
er federally regulated industries governed by antitrust laws, except for those few that 
are still ‘pervasively’ regulated from which direct conflict with antitrust laws could 
flow. Even after the recent financial crisis and regulatory response, the need for an-
titrust enforcement in federally regulated industries, including the vast majority of 
securities regulations, remains strong. 
 
A. The Court’s refinement of the clearly repugnant standard is consistent with the need 
for implied antitrust immunity because of the sometimes dueling purposes of securities 
regulations and antitrust laws. 
Antitrust laws and securities laws are inextricably linked.  The Roaring 20’s relaxa-
tion of antitrust enforcement under President Calvin Coolidge partially led to the 
need for securities laws.206  The modern corporation is a byproduct of the “trusts, 
mergers and holding companies of the late 19th century,”207 and securities laws are 
in place to regulate that modern corporation and its security shares.208 
However, while both antitrust laws and securities laws were enacted as responses 
to major economic developments in America, they serve different purposes.  Anti-
trust laws were enacted to protect competition.209  On the other hand, securities laws 
                                                                
 203. 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See infra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying text. 
 206. Bittlingmayer, supra note 36, at 393 (arguing that “trust-busting hurt business confidence”). See also 
supra Part II.C.1. 
 207. Bittlingmayer, supra note 36, at 363.  
 208. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing 
Importance for Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1577 (2004) (stating that private law is imperative to 
market stability and creating public confidence). See also supra Part II.C. 
 209. See supra Part II.A-B for a discussion of the purpose of antitrust laws and their details. In his opinion in 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. [hereinafter Alcoa], 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d. Cir. 1945) Judge Learned 
Hand stated that “great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable” for political and economic reasons 
(quoted in Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 1053); see also id. at 1063 (asserting that Congress also saw implementa-
tion of antitrust laws as a means to prevent Communism from becoming widespread).  The argument was that 
having only a few huge corporations and trusts could “facilitate the overthrow[ing] of democratic institutions.” 
Id. at 1054. Another rationale for antitrust was consumer welfare. See Bittlingmayer, supra note 36, at 371–73;  
Bork & Bowman, Jr., supra note 36, at 365 (stating that competition is “desirable” because it “assists in achiev-
ing a prosperous society”). An interesting result of antitrust’s aim for deterrence of collusion between firms is 
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were enacted half a century after the major antitrust legislation in response to the 
Great Depression to boost investor confidence and change how securities were re-
gulated in the United States.210  As demonstrated in the precedential case law, name-
ly Silver, NASD, and Gordon, the SEC’s regulations sometimes encourage anticom-
petitive behavior.211 
Since antitrust laws were also crafted to deter ‘direct regulation’ of the market 
economy and because securities laws require direct governmental regulation,212 
there are times when securities laws are ‘clearly repugnant’ to antitrust laws.213  
Congress recognized this conundrum and explicitly repealed antitrust laws in some 
specific instances.214 Since antitrust laws still attempt to prevent unhealthy coopera-
tion and since securities laws sometimes explicitly require firm cooperation,215 the 
two realms have the potential to clash.216  Thus, there is a demonstrated need for 
implied antitrust immunity in certain narrow areas of securities regulation. 
B. The narrow exceptions to antitrust enforcement carved out by the court in the Billing 
decision will not likely be extended to other less ‘pervasively’ regulated industries 
because Billing is continuous with the Court’s implied antitrust immunity precedents. 
The securities industry is still considered to be ‘pervasively’ regulated, even in this 
era of continuing industry deregulation.217 When an industry is heavily regulated by 
the government, there are fewer gaps for antitrust laws to fill.218 The pervasive regu-
                                                                                                                                                    
that because antitrust laws, when working properly, deter this behavior, it is difficult to “quantify the benefits” 
derived from the laws. J. Baker, supra note 54, at 40.  
 210. See supra Part II.C for background on securities laws.  See also Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 1067 (averring 
that political concerns of antitrust should be seen as “limited factors that influence the way in which prospective 
rules are designed to accomplish antitrust objectives”). 
 211. See supra Part II.D and accompanying text. 
 212. Pitofsky, supra note 38, at 1057. Pitofsky also argues that antitrust served to deter Marxism from enter-
ing into the mainstream American economy. Id.   
 213. See supra Part II.C. 
214. Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 344–45. For example, the major area in which Congress has expressly im-
munized an area from antitrust is in labor. Id. Additionally, Congress specifically stated that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was specifically enacted to grant statutory immun ty from “the business of insurance.”  Even 
though the scope of insurance issues is unclear, t is evident that Congress statutor ly barred some antitrust suits 
from being brought against the industry. Bush, supra note 69, at 782. Another example is the Healthcare Quality 
Improvement Act, which allows hospital boards to fire physicians for just cause without being subject to anti-
trust laws. Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 345. But note that even though express immunity seems clear-cut, it 
can be controversial and convoluted. If the parameters are not well defined by Congress, compet tion should be 
the “default rule.” Bush, supra note 69, at 782–83. 
 215. Specific activities that encourage anticompetitive behavior are minimum commission rates, “rules for-
mulated to restrict multiple trading in listed securities,;restrictive exchange membership requirements [(SEC 
Rule 19(b))] . . . that tend to control entry into the market; and even proposals for eliminating . . . paperwork 
backlogs . . . [in] brokerage houses.” See  Robert W. Wild, Antitrust and the Securities Industry: Lessons from the 
Shipping Industry, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 100–01 (1969–1970) (noting that antitrust principles “have not been 
a significant factor in SEC decisions”). 
 216. See supra Part II.A.  
 217. See supra Part II.C. 
 218. See supra Part II.B. 
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lation of the securities industry was a prerequisite in Billing for the Court to begin 
addressing whether antitrust might be implicitly precluded.219 Thus, in order for the 
implicit preclusion of antitrust to be extended to other industries, it would be poss-
ible only in other pervasively regulated industries, similar to that of securities regu-
lation.220 
1. Some commentators erroneously argue that Billing will open the floodgates and 
create a plethora of implied antitrust immunity holdings even in other less-pervasively 
federally regulated industries. 
Immediately following the Billing,221 decision, criticisms were immediately voiced 
fearing that antitrust laws would fall by the wayside and findings of implied im-
munity would increase exponentially.222  For example, at least one commentator ar-
gued that Billing stood for the proposition that in regulated industries, a sector-
specific regulator should be responsible for handling both regulations and antitrust 
concerns in that industry.223  Another critic stated that in the post-Billing world, it is 
necessary to look first to regulatory remedies instead of bringing antitrust enforce-
ment claims in regulated industries.224  Scholars began questioning if Billing’s im-
plied antitrust immunity could be extended to other industries, such as the mort-
gage lending industry.225  Others argued that the standard employed by the Court 
lowered the threshold for finding implied antitrust immunity.226 However, the Bill-
ing decision does not break the continuity of the Court’s previous decisions regard-
ing implied antitrust immunity in pervasively regulated federal industries: rather, it 
fits squarely within the Court’s prior requirements for implied antitrust immunity 
to apply.227 
                                                                
 219. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 220. See discussion supra Part II.C.1–2. 
 221. Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 222. See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. 
 223. Timothy J. Brennan, Essential Facilities and Trinko: Should Antitrust and Regulation be Combined?, 61 
FED. COMM. L.J. 133, 143 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Trinko represented a 
change in the previous antitrust precedents in regulated industries). 
 224. Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 11 
(2009). 
 225. See generally Bruce H. Schneider, Cred t Suisse v. Billing and a Case for Antitrust Immunity for Mortgage 
Lenders Subject to Federal Regulation, 124 BANKING L. J. 833 (2007) (arguing that after Billing, implied antitrust 
immun ty should be applied to the federally regulated mortgage lending industry because Freddie Mac’s regula-
tory system is similar to that of securities in that it encourages anticompetitive behavior in mortgage lending). 
 226. Justin Lacour, Note: Unclear Repugnancy: Antitrust Immunity in Securities Markets after Credit Suisse 
Securities LLC v. Billing, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. R. 1116, 1156 (2009) (arguing that the Court changed the clear repug-
nancy standard for finding implied antitrust immunity to a cost-benefit standard, thereby making the “finding 
of implied immunity all too easy.”). 
 227. See Einer Elhauge, Harvard, not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme Court Deci-
sions?, 3 COMP. POLICY INT’L. 1, 11 (2007) (noting that the Credit Suisse decision was not a “big change from the 
implied exemption law of past cases”).  See also supra Part II.B.2 and II.D and accompanying text. 
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2. The Court has continuously determined that implied antitrust immunity is 
applicable only in pervasively regulated industries, and even then only in the specific 
area of that industry where implied immunity is necessary to make the federal 
regulatory scheme operable. 
Even though the Court upheld implied antitrust immunity in some narrowly de-
fined circumstances in industries before the deregulation of most pervasively feder-
ally regulated industries,228 the Court still refused to extend implied antitrust im-
munity across the entire securities industry in Billing.229  Because implied antitrust 
immunity is only hesitantly allowed, the Court only carefully permitted it in narrow 
circumstances, and even then, the Court did not permit the implied antitrust im-
munity to apply to an entire industry: it only applied to the specific area of regula-
tion being challenged.230 
3. Cases after Billing continue to refuse to extend implied antitrust immunity to other 
less pervasively regulated industries, thereby adhering to the precedent set by the 
Supreme Court over the past century. 
In the short time period since the Billing decision, lower courts have already refused 
to extend it’s holding to other less pervasively regulated industries because a ‘clear 
repugnancy’ between the antitrust laws and the promulgated regulations does not 
exist.231   
At least two courts have determined that different prongs of the four-pronged 
Billing test have not been met in their decisions regarding the extension of implied 
antitrust immunity.  In Energy Marketing Services, Inc. v. Columbia Gas Transmis-
sion Corp.,232 the Southern District of West Virginia held that the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s regulatory scheme did not warrant a finding of implied 
antitrust preclusion because there was not the same danger of resulting inconsistent 
standards between antitrust enforcement and regulatory enforcement as there was 
in Billing.233  In Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC,234 the District of Massachusetts 
held that antitrust laws were not implicitly precluded under the leveraged buyout 
laws because the securities laws and the leveraged buyout offer laws at issue were 
                                                                
 228. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra notes 75–91 and accompanying text. 
 231. See infra notes 232–40 and accompanying text. 
 232. 639 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D. W.Va. 2009). 
 233. Id. at 649. The District Court noted further that Billing was an “unusual” case. It also highlighted the 
fact that securities laws and the SEC encourage joint action, whereas it is not specifically encouraged in energy 
regulation. Id. at 650. Additionally, the FERC maintains less regulatory authority over energy regulation than 
the SEC does over securities. Id. at 652. 
 234. 589 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.Mass. 2008). 
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not clearly incompatible with each other and thus implied immunity was non-
existent.235 
Other courts have determined that the Billing decision simply does not extend to 
other federally regulated industries.  For example, in Axcan Scandipharm Inc. v. 
Ethex Corp.,236 the District of Minnesota held that a manufacturer’s false advertising 
claims were not precluded by the regulatory power of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA).237  In its decision, the court stated that the Billing decision did not 
“break any new ground” in regards to the Lanham Act.238  In In re Western States 
Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig.,239 the District of Nevada held that there was 
no implicit antitrust preclusion under the Commodity Exchange Act for natural gas 
producers.240   
C.  Even in previously ‘pervasively’ regulated federal industries, it is unlikely that the 
threshold to establish implied antitrust immunity will be met. 
As noted in the above section, courts have already begun refusing to extend the Bill-
ing implied antitrust preclusion to both other areas of the securities industry regu-
lated by the SEC and to other federally regulated industries.241  This is because even 
though other industries are federally regulated, they do not possess the same sort of 
pervasive authority as the SEC possesses over securities regulation and because these 
other industries do not have the same relationship with antitrust laws that securities 
laws maintain.242  Thus, there is not the same threat of inconsistent standards that 
would cause injury as there was in Billing because the securities industry is unique 
in its regulatory framework.243  Even if certain industries were once very heavily, 
even arguably pervasively, regulated the deregulation of federally regulated indus-
tries has further narrowed the number of industries that might argue pervasive reg-
                                                                
 235. See id. at 116. The District Court stated that securities laws did not regulate the conduct in question, 
that there is no pervasive regulatory authority overseeing private equity transactions and that the SEC did not 
maintain regulatory authority in this area. Therefore, securities laws and the leveraged buyout offer laws at issue 
were not clearly incompatible with each other and thus implied immunity was non-existent. Id. at 117. 
 236. 585 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D.Minn. 2007). 
 237. Id. at 1076. 
 238. Id. The Lanham Act regulates drug marketing and provides a regulatory scheme in which drug compa-
nies can market their drug products. Id. at 1077. The Court further noted that even if Billing did change the 
precedent, there still would be no implied immunity from claims against the FDA because there was no danger 
of ‘serious conflict’ between the FDA’s regulations and the claims in the case. Id.  
 239. 661 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D.Nev. 2009). 
 240. Id. at 1172. Even though three Billing factors were met in this case, the District Court refused to extend 
implied antitrust immunity because there was no danger for inconsistent results or standards if antitrust claims 
were allowed to move forward. Id. at 1183. Specifically, the natural gas sales were not analogous to the securities 
syndicates in place for IPOs and aftermarkets. Id. at 1183. 
 241. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 242. See supra Part II.B. 
 243. See supra Part III for a discussion of why inconsistent standards are so dangerous in the Billing fact set 
and in securities generally. 
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ulation.244 Additionally, for a finding of implied antitrust immunity to be applied, 
the federally regulated industry will have to prove that there is a clear repugnancy 
between its regulations and the antitrust laws through use of the 4-part test enume-
rated in Billing.245  This is a very high, specific threshold to meet.246  It is therefore 
unlikely that unless an industry is pervasively regulated, similarly to the securities 
industry, that the proponent will make its case successfully.247 
The utilities industry is one which might be argued as being pervasively regulated 
leading to inconsistent standards if antitrust laws are enforced.  The manner in 
which the utilities industry is regulated is similar to that of securities.248 Because of 
this similarity, if the utilities industry can convince the Court that it is still perva-
sively regulated and that its specific regulatory scheme is inconsistent with antitrust 
enforcement, it might have a viable claim to implicit antitrust preclusion. Overall, 
however, because of the Ottertail precedent rejecting implied antitrust immunity in 
the utilities industry under the National Gas Act,249 it is unlikely that the Supreme 
Court will agree with the pervasive argument.250  
Another industry which is seemingly a good candidate for a narrow extension of 
implied antitrust immunity is the telecommunications industry, which was very 
heavily regulated.251 However, there has been a recent flood of new, competitive 
communication providers following the deregulatory 1996 Telecommunications 
Act.252 In Trinko,253 the Supreme Court held that a savings clause bars a finding of 
implied antitrust immunity.254 However, at least one antitrust expert believes that 
this was an erroneous holding and that there might be a small window for the Court 
to change its mind in regards to finding implied antitrust immunity in the tele-
communications industry.255 Based on current precedent, though, it seems that at 
                                                                
 244. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 245. See supra Part III. 
 246. One author goes as far as to state that the Billing decision might have actually further narrowed implied 
antitrust preclusion doctrine. Elhauge, supra note 227, at 11 (averring that it might even become a unique ex-
emption to antitrust, similar to the labor and insurance antitrust exemptions). 
 247. See supra notes 242–46 and accompanying text.  
 248. See supra Part II.B for discussion of regulatory framework of utilities. 
 249. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 250. In fact, “peaceful coexistence” between the regulatory scheme and antitrust laws is feasible “because . . . 
courts interpret both the regulatory and antitrust statutes.” Areeda, supra note 38, at 53.  
 251. See supra Part II.B.2 for discussion of regulatory framework of the telecommunications industry. 
252. Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 367. For example, there are many cable television providers, telephone pro-
viders, internet providers and other side industries related to telecommunications. Id.  
 253. 540 U.S. 398 (2004) 
 254. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 255. See Hovenkamp, supra note 38, at 373  (arguing that utilizing the savings clause to preclude implied 
immun ty findings in telecommunications was not consistent with the goals of the Telecommunications Act). 
But note Alexander, supra note 54, at 243–44 (arguing generally that there is no implied antitrust immunity 
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 prior to the Court’s ruling in Trinko).  Alexander further argues 
that ant trust is important to ensure fair telecommunications and that based on Judge Greene’s ruling in United 
States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (denying implied immunity to 
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least for the near future, implied antitrust immunity in the telecommunications in-
dustry will not be deemed permissible by the Court, even following the decision in 
Billing. 
D.  Since the financial meltdown in 2008, the Securities industry has become 
increasingly concentrated, and there has been a sweep of new regulations, both of which 
might have implications for further antitrust claims to be alleged against the securities 
industry.  
Even in the securities industry, which has been deemed to be ‘pervasively’ regu-
lated,256 the fallout from the recent financial crisis has resulted in a more concen-
trated banking industry.257 Thus, antitrust concerns might arise despite the Court’s 
precedent that implied antitrust immunity can apply to the securities industry.258  
However, even though the Court proscribed in Silver, NASD, Gordon, and Billing 
that there are times when antitrust is clearly repugnant to the securities regulatory 
scheme, the Court did not extend the decision to the entire securities industry, re-
gardless of its being pervasively regulated.259  Thus, antitrust laws can still be en-
forced in certain areas of the securities industry. 
Despite the new Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
which provides many new regulations that the financial industry must follow, the 
potential that the Court will extend the narrow implied antitrust immunity to these 
broad reforms is limited.260  For example,  although Billing extended the implied an-
titrust immunity to the securities regulations pertaining to underwriting syndicates 
in the IPO process, it is not at all clear that the Court would be willing to extend this 
precedent to investment banks generally or to the new securities regulations pro-
scribed in the Dodd-Frank legislation, especially given the Court’s general hesitancy 
in applying implied antitrust immunity to federal regulations.261   
                                                                                                                                                    
the telephone giant because it was not regulated in a pervasive enough manner to trigger the rare implied anti-
trust immunity). Id. at 244–45.  
 256. See supra Part II.C. 
 257. See supra Part II.B. 
 258. The consolidation of the securities industry poses several competition issues. For example, the newly 
merged firm could possess deposits that exceed the allowable statutory thresholds maintained by the Fed. Addi-
tionally, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice can hone in on a specific antitrust concern: for in-
stance, cred t card processing services provided to small and medium size businesses. Jonathan M. Rich & 
Thomas G. Scriven, Bank Consolidation Caused by the Financial Crisis: How Should the Antitrust Division Review 
“Shotgun Marriages”?, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 6 (Dec. 2008), available at http://new.abanet.org/antitrust 
/Searchable Antitrust Library/Dec08-RichC.pdf. See generally Foster, supra note 149, at 778  (arguing that there 
will be a great cost to the American economy in the long run if antitrust concerns are not taken into account 
now). 
 259. Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007).The Court stated that the antitrust laws were 
‘clearly incompatible’ with antitrust laws “in this context.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 260. See generally Clemmitt, supra note 152, at 631.  See also infra notes 241–50 and accompanying text. 
 261. Foster, supra note 149, at 780–81 (noting that even though the financial and banking sectors of the US 
economy are heavily regulated, mergers taking place within them are still subject to antitrust laws); Rich & Scri-
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Regarding investment banks, with the consolidation of banks into two major 
players (JP Morgan and Bank of America), it has become a potential danger ground 
for new antitrust concerns.262  Even with the new oversight provided for in the 
Dodd-Frank Act,263 this industry consolidation lends itself to antitrust claims be-
cause there is a succession of mergers taking place without first going through the 
regulatory overview process.264  Additionally, competition between firms is still an 
important part of the United States economy.265  If this industry consolidation re-
sults in a decrease in the level of competition in the securities industry, even more 
antitrust concerns will become prevalent.   
Whereas the market crash of the Great Depression led to a period of intense reg-
ulation and lax antitrust enforcement,266 the current financial crisis fallout has not 
included the same rush by lawmakers to drastically increase regulated enterprises in 
                                                                                                                                                    
ven, supra note 258, at 7 (noting that a “substantial increase in concentration in a vital part of the economy 
creates the opportunity for anticompetitive effects in an area in which the economy can ill afford them”). 
 262. See supra Part II.E. 
 263. See supra Part II.E. 
 264. For example, the Department of Justice has allowed un-reviewed mergers to take place between com-
mercial and investment banks. Id. This has led to both horizontal and vertical consolidations that pose real 
questions about antitrust and the role of competition in future banking. FRESHFIELDS, BRUCKHAUS, DERINGER, 
LLP, BRIEFING, ANTITRUST IN THE DOWNTURN, (2008), available at 
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs /2008/nov08/24682.pdf.  These quickly accomplished mergers 
have been likened to “shotgun marriages.” Rich & Scriven, supra note 258, at 1. However, there are still tools 
that the oversight agencies possess to ensure that antitrust laws are being complied w th and that competition 
still exists. For example, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
can use either a ‘pocket decree’ or a “blank check” to approve transactions while still reserving the right to con-
tinue investigation once the merger takes place. Id. See also Foster, supra note 149, at 778 (noting that there was 
“apathy” towards the competition issues arising because of these large mergers); Vickers, supra note 147, at 4  
(noting that a policy response to the crisis was to “bypass [] competition” to allow these mergers to occur). But 
see White, supra note 145, at 41 (noting that as long as the DOJ-FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines remain in 
place, even large bank mergers will most likely not pose major antitrust concerns because the regulations will be 
national in scope. However, White acknowledges that in smaller to medium size banking loans, there will most 
likely be ant trust problems because information asymmetries will increase); see also Suriwiecki, supra note 151, 
at 46 (noting that through a “series of government-sanctioned mergers,” the four main banks now control “for-
ty per cent of . . . total banking deposits and two-thirds of its credit cards”). 
 265. See Shapiro, supra note 143, at 16; Rich & Scriven, supra note 258, at 7 (noting that antitrust laws 
should continue to be “relevant” in the post-Financial crisis landscape); see also Foster, supra note 149, at 781 
(stating that competition is good for the “national economic health”). See also White, supra note 145, at 9 (not-
ing that the only world in which antitrust is the “ideal” is the world in which there are only well-functioning 
markets with no external ties or sp llover problems—in short, this world does not exist). White also proposes 
modifications to financial regulation that will encourage competition. He proposes allowing the following: giv-
ing banks authority to:  
“[p]ay interest on business checking accounts . . . [a]llow[ing] non-financial companies to own 
banks…[r]epeal[ing] the Community Reinvestment Act . . . [e]nd[ing] collective filing of insurance 
rates . . . [o]ffer[ing] a federal insurance charter. . . [ and] [r]eplac[ing] the regulation of credit rat-
ing agencies with a regulatory structure that would encourage competition.”  
Id. at 43, 45.  But see Gheorghe Oprescu et al., The Real Economy and Competition Policy in Periods of Retrench-
ment, 3 AMFITEATRU ECON. 723, 728 (2009) (arguing that because government intervention and regulation will 
be the foundation for economic recovery, there will be “significant challenges” to competition).   
 266. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text for discussion about regulations during the Great De-
pression 
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the U.S.267  Although there has been an increase in regulation, particularly with the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, it has not been nearly as widespread or as sweeping 
as it was during the Depression.268  Thus, even though the securities industry is per-
vasively regulated and lends itself to implied immunity claims against antitrust, it is 
probable that the Court will not extend this implied immunity in the wake of the 
recent financial crisis. 
V. Conclusion 
In Credit Suisse v. Billing,269 the Supreme Court of the United States correctly deter-
mined that antitrust laws were implicitly precluded because there was a ‘clear re-
pugnancy’ between the antitrust laws and certain securities regulations.  In so hold-
ing, the Court narrowly and consistently extended its previous precedents in finding 
implicit antitrust preclusion.270  This implied antitrust immunity is unlikely to be 
broadly extended to other federally regulated industries governed by antitrust laws.  
Even in the wake of the recent financial crisis, it is unlikely that antitrust laws will be 
brushed aside in the flurry of new regulations and fast-tracked bank mergers.  Anti-
trust continues to play an important role in the U.S. economy and operation of the 
marketplace. 
 
 
 
                                                                
 267. Shapiro, supra note 143, at 16 (also noting that instead, some lawmakers are asking for more antitrust 
exemptions but reiterating that the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division does not support any more anti-
trust immunities). However, that is not to say that there has been no government intervention or increased reg-
ulation. This paper does not seek to downplay the validity of the government intervention: rather, it seeks to 
explain the necessity for both regulation and competition. See generally Robert E. Wright, Financial Crisis and 
Reform: Looking Back for Clues to the Future, THE MCKINSEY QUARTERLY, Dec. 2008 at 1 (noting that regulatory 
reforms take place after every major financial crisis in the U.S). 
 268. Government regulatory responses to the financial crisis included many policies. For example, there was 
the government bailout of the U.S. Auto Industry, the government bailout and regulatory review of banks, tem-
porary bans on short selling and cuts in interest rates. Vickers, supra note 147, at 4–5. There are many policy 
arguments for the increase in regulation. One of the most persuasive is the argument stating that because bank 
failures are negative for society as a whole, it is important to avoid such failure, particularly through increased 
regulation. See Kashyap et al., supra note 145, at 444.  Specifically in the financial sector, financial ‘safety’ is the 
main justification for regulating the securities industry. White, supra note 145, at 13. This is accomplished 
through regulatory overview of financial institutions and the disclosure of financial information to decrease 
information asymmetries. Id. at 14–15. Securities laws are especially aimed at full disclosure. Id. at 27. 
 269. 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 270. See infra Part II.D. 
